According to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism by James Forest and Russel Howards, what efforts have been made by the international community to prevent the formation of future networks like the Khan network?
The text tells us that the Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan network facilitated nuclear proliferation among rogue nations. Up until 2003 and 2004, the A.Q. Khan network (made up of a loose coalition of engineers, businessmen, and industrialists) supplied materials, equipment, and technology to rogue nations for their illicit nuclear programs. These nations included Iran, Libya, and North Korea.
Traditionally, the international community has relied on specialized intelligence operations, international injunctions, and preemptive military actions to thwart nuclear proliferation activities. However, there are serious limitations to these approaches.
The A.Q. Khan network was eventually disbanded through an intricate collaboration between the United States, United Kingdom, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The international community now fears that North Korean players will constitute the next A.Q. Khan network.
To date, there have been several efforts by the international community to prevent the formation of future networks like the Khan network. Two main ones are discussed in the book.
First, several European countries have trained their personnel to detect suspicious procurement inquiries. Since a military nuclear program often needs thousands of requisite items, rogue nations rely on global suppliers to meet that need. During the resource-gathering phase, rogue actors send out seemingly innocent inquiries about pricing for parts. However, European countries now rely on cooperation between manufacturing suppliers and governmental authorities to detect suspicious inquiries. For example, a European vacuum manufacturer received inquiries in 2002 and 2003 from countries such as Iran and North Korea.
The inquiries coincided with the exposure of the Natanz gas centrifuge plant in Iran. The European manufacturer immediately alerted authorities to the suspicious inquiries. Due to specialized knowledge about how the company's products could serve dual purposes, the supplier was able to take action. The European authorities passed on the information to other governments, but the process took more than a year. In the end, it was determined that certain types of vacuum valves could be used in gas centrifuges. So, early detection is necessary, and this is the goal of the international community in preventing the formation of future nuclear proliferation networks. The text provides other examples as well.
The book also discusses another method used by the international community. This is in reference to disrupting the proliferation hubs or nodes that make up a network. First, there are several large, dominant nodes or hubs. These hubs are connected to smaller nodes on the periphery. So, the dominant hubs rely on these peripheral actors to cover their tracks. It is the dominant nodes that make procurement inquiries, and they are difficult to detect.
In countries like Iran and Pakistan, authorities are even inclined to protect those dominant nodes or hubs. Since these nations are unlikely to extradite the guilty party, countries like the United States have lured node representatives overseas to "friendly" countries. There, these individuals are arrested and then extradited to the United States. For example, the US authorities used this approach to apprehend Amir Hossein Ardebili, a procurement agent of American military equipment. Ardebili was lured to Tbilisi, Georgia and arrested there. Georgia then extradited him to the United States.
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